INTRODUCTION
Beginning students often enter law school expecting that the rules they study will provide clear and ready answers to legal problems. "What is the governing rule?" they want to know. "What is the answer to this hypothetical?" But the world of the practicing lawyer is, as often as not, clouded by ambiguity: The law may be vague or in flux. Conflicting legal rules may bear upon a single problem. The evidence needed to resolve the problem may be unavailable, incomplete or contradictory. Predicting the vagaries of human behavior is often dicey. Thus, advising clients about complex future events-how a judge or jury might resolve a disputed claim, how a business competitor might respond to a buyout offer or threatened lawsuit, whether a government official will react favorably to one or another set of arguments offered on the client's behalf--often involves considerable uncertainty.
As law professors, we attempt to stimulate in our students flexible thinking and an appreciation for legal and factual indeterminacy. A former law dean 1 had a stock orientation speech in which he exhorted students on their first day of law school to "revel in the ambiguity." The leading law school exam study guide, entitled "Getting to Maybe," is to similar effect. 2 We spend three years with our students deconstructing legal texts, considering whether appellate decisions were adequately reasoned and rightly decided, and trying to promote multi-sided class-room discussions of complex (and sometimes "hot button") issues. In the spirit of liberal arts educators everywhere, we hope that with the proper training, we can inculcate dispassionate, open-minded judgment on the part of all our students. But is this realistic?
Previous empirical research has demonstrated the overall tendency of lawyers to adopt a too favorable view of the merits of their cases-a 1.
The late George Schatzki, Dean of the University of Connecticut School of Law from 1994 to 2000. 2.
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY R. PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW SCHOOL EXAMS (1999). The authors write: "What you will find inside the typical law school exam question is ambiguity, and we think that learning to live with it-indeed, learning to search it out and exploit it-is the key to doing well on law school exams." Id. at 17.
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I. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Three lines of empirical research bear upon the current investigation: 1) studies of the effects of various judgmental biases on disputants and lawyers; 2) attempts to reduce some of these biases through "consider-theopposite" de-biasing interventions; and 3) general explorations of motivational differences that may affect individuals' susceptibility to judgmental bias in the first place.
A. Judgmental Biases in Disputing
Dispute resolution scholars have long recognized that, when placed in an adversary stance, disputants and their lawyers are susceptible to judgmental biases. These cognitive and motivational distortions include (but are not limited to) primacy effects; confirmation bias; the fundamental attribution error; and egocentric and self-serving biases, including inappropriate levels of confidence in one's judgment and decision-making abilities, contributions to past outcomes, and ability to predict or positively control future ones. 
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Lawyering Bias and Need for Closure 177 substantially so) than the results they achieved at trial. 7 Neither the number of years of a lawyer's experience nor the ranking of his or her law school affected these error rates. Aggregated, these decisional errors were estimated to cost the clients in these matters more than $1 billion, not including additional trial costs and attorneys' fees. 8 The effects of overconfidence bias on disputing behavior have also been demonstrated in several simulation studies, suggesting that even random assignment to a simulated partisan role can lead to significant distortions in the way that subjects assess evidence, make predictions, and behave. Such partisan role bias has been shown to affect both parties 9 and their agent-representatives. 10 One illustrative experiment involving parties (which we build on here and is discussed in greater detail below), found that undergraduate and law student subjects, given identical case file materials from a factually ambiguous personal injury case, had widely different predictions of the most likely judicial outcome, depending on whether they were assigned to the plaintiff or defendant role. 11 The researchers also found strong evidence of biased assimilation of the information provided, both in students' recall and weighting of arguments: each side recalled more arguments favoring their side's position than those favoring the other side, and each believed that a judge or jury would find "their" arguments superior to opposing ones. 12 In a more recent study involving party representatives, Eigen and Listokin found that first year law students, randomly assigned to argue one side or another of closely-balanced 7 .
Randall Kiser et al.
, Let's Not Make a Deal: An Empirical Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement
Negotiations, 55 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 590 (2008) (finding that plaintiffs and defendants made settlement errors at a rate of 61% and 24% respectively, but that defense errors tended to be "whoppers," with a mean error size of $1,140,000 compared to a mean error size for plaintiffs of $43,100); RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND appellate legal problem on behalf of a client in a moot court competition, each believed on average that the merits favored their side.
13
In addition to distorting predictive accuracy in valuing cases, partisan role bias has also been shown to affect fairness assessments in bargaining. In general, when people are placed in competitive roles or settings involving conflict, their views of fairness are tinged with self-interest.
14
The fundamental attribution error can lead disputants to attribute hostile meanings to other people's motives in conflict settings, increasing "hawkish" behaviors and making the resolution of disputes more difficult.
15 When bargaining, negotiators often "reactively devalue" settlement offers made by the opposing side, simply on account of their source. 16 These kinds of biases often affect us unconsciously. Empirical research suggests that most human beings suffer from a bias "blind spot," causing them to think that "other people" are biased, while they are fair and objective. 17 In part for this reason, neither instructing people about the distorting effects of biases on human decision making, nor admonishing them to be "fair and objective" has been found to be effective in reducing 13 By contrast, one de-biasing technique that has shown considerable experimental success involves "consider the opposite" (CTO) promptsinterventions that ask subjects to generate, list, explain or imagine in detail reasons why their answer, hypothesis, prediction of future events or proposed decisions might be wrong. CTO prompts are a form of "counterattitudinal advocacy" 20 --role-playing exercises in which subjects are invited to generate and articulate opinions that may not correspond with their inner convictions.
21
Consider-the-opposite prompts have been shown to reduce cognitive biases and improve decision making in a variety of domains not involving strong motivational investment. For example, they have been found to reduce subjects' overconfidence in the accuracy of their answers to general knowledge questions; 22 24 Human beings are susceptible to cognitive biases because even when they know that the best decisions will be produced by considering all sides of a question, they tend to engage in one-sided thinking. 25 They rely on heuristics to arrive at their decisions and often truncate the search for additional information.
26 CTO prompts appear to improve open-mindedness by reducing people's natural resistance to the consideration of alternatives once they have settled upon a focal hypothesis.
27
Of course, cognitive biases often come in stronger, motivated forms as well. 28 Motivational biases are judgmental distortions caused by a desire to believe something, whether because of ego investment, ideological commitment, or a stake in the outcome. 29 For example, when people with strong commitments to a political ideology are confronted with evidence that contradicts their beliefs, they tend to ignore or discount it--the "irrational belief persistence effect."
30 Even here, consider-the-opposite prompts have shown some promise in reducing bias.
31
In studies of case valuation and disputing, consider-the-opposite prompts have generated mixed results. In one negotiation simulation 23 
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Lawyering Bias and Need for Closure 181 study, discussed further below, 32 researchers found that a CTO "list the weaknesses in your case" instruction was highly effective at reducing overconfidence bias in case valuation. However, in a subsequent study of overconfidence bias on the part of practicing lawyers in actual cases, researchers were unable to replicate this result. Commenting on the discrepancy between their research findings and those reported in the earlier simulation study, the authors commented: "[a] more profound investment in the outcome of real-life cases may increase resistance to debiasing interventions." 
C. The Need for Cognitive Closure
The present study expands on previous research by examining whether individual differences-specifically differences regarding tolerance for ambiguity and open-mindedness-affect law students' susceptibility to judgmental biases. Dispositional open versus closed-mindedness has been a subject of considerable social science research for more than thirty years and has been investigated in variety of ways. It has not, however, previously been a focus of much dispute resolution scholarship. 34 In this study, we utilize a psychometric scale called the "Need for (Nonspecific) Cognitive Closure Scale" (NFCS) to measure individual differences in this motivational trait. 35 Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) refers to the extent to which individuals tend to prefer an answer-any answer-to ambiguity or confusion. It is a generalized need, to be distinguished from the need for specific closure, i.e., the desire for particular answers to questions for specific (e.g., ego-protecting) reasons. 38 This scale has been translated into multiple languages and different versions of it have been used in more than one hundred social science experiments, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. Most NFC research to date has focused on lay, not expert decision making.
39
According to the scale's principal developer, the need for cognitive closure is "involved in all human judgments and decisions and hence its effects must be considered value free in principle." 40 For example, low-NFC individuals may be more receptive to nuance and complexity than high-NFC individuals, but they may also be less comfortable and consistent in making decisions, and less committed to their clients. Conversely, high-NFC individuals may be more decisive and committed than low-NFC individuals, but less creative in group processes, less able to tailor a message to an audience, and more likely to view conflict in competitive rather than cooperative terms. There is good reason to hypothesize that need for closure variations may have an influence on law students' and lawyers' predictive judgments and fairness assessments when they are engaged in a representative lawyering role. Among other effects, high-(versus low-) NFC individuals have been shown to have a strong tendency to reduce their discomfort with uncertainty by forming judgments quickly and impulsively, based on early-received information (primacy effects, or "seizing"); to be resistant to subsequent relevant information and persuasion in order to maintain their beliefs (irrational belief persistence, or "freezing"); to have undue confidence in the validity of their own views (the "true believer" effect); and to be less able to generate alternative hypotheses to explain ambiguous events.
42 NFC variations may also affect the ability of individuals to engage in perspective-taking and avoid stereotyping others.
43
Lawyers are called upon to make difficult predictions, based on their evaluation of complex and often conflicting evidence, received over time. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that high-NFC attorneys may be more susceptible than low-NFC attorneys to the influence of their clients' narratives-the first version of events they are likely to hear, as well as more resistant to revising their assessments of a matter in light of new information learned through witness interviews, review of documents, depositions and the like. The fact that lawyers often work in high conflict settings, in which parties often engage in negative attributions about their opponents, may exacerbate these tendencies.
D. Summary of Precursor Studies
In order to test the effects of dispositional need for closure on lawyering judgment, we modified two experiments, conducted in 1993 and 1998 (the 1993 Experiment and the 1998 Experiment, respectively). 44 In the 1993 Experiment, a group of eighty undergraduate and eighty law students were given condensed but identical case file materials from an actual, recently 
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Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 59:173 litigated motorcycle accident case, which students were told had been arbitrated by a retired Texas judge. Plaintiff Jones was a motorcycle driver who suffered injury when he was rear-ended by Johnson, the defendant motorist. Jones seeks $100,000 in damages for his injuries. The accident occurred in a split second, at an intersection with poor sight lines that witnesses say is hazardous. No witnesses saw the actual collision. The defendant admits that he had been drinking earlier in the day, but there is conflicting evidence about whether he was impaired at the time of the collision. The plaintiff may or may not have been contributorily negligent in entering the intersection; under Texas law, he will recover nothing if his negligence is determined to have exceeded the defendant's. The physical evidence is inconclusive as to how the accident occurred. The plaintiff's "pain and suffering" damages claim appears overstated in relation to the medical evidence in support of it. Neither litigant is especially articulate or persuasive. 45 In short, "Jones v. Johnson" is an ordinary car accident case of a kind litigated in state courts every day. It is legally simple, but factually ambiguous. If tried to a judge or jury, widely variable outcomes are possible.
Student subjects in the 1993 Experiment were randomly assigned to the role of plaintiff or defendant and asked to predict what monetary award the judge-arbitrator would order and what settlement outcome would be "fair." They were then paired off and instructed to negotiate in an effort to reach a settlement. 46 Note that, although subjects were told that a judge had arbitrated the case and were asked to predict his "award," this was merely an artifact of the experiment. (In actuality, an expert with relevant civil litigation experience read the materials and placed a "value" on the case.) The researchers were not concerned with how close or far students' predictions were from the (faux) judicial arbitration award or whether their predictions were "correct." Rather, they were interested in whether, and to what extent, plaintiffs' and defendants' arbitral predictions and fair settlement value assessments would differ from each other, simply on account of their assigned role. They chose a rich and factually ambiguous case file, with a variety of possible arguments available to each side, because they hypothesized that self-serving assessments were more likely to occur in such situations than with a simpler, more stylized fact pattern.
47
The researchers found, on average, that students assigned to the role of plaintiff predicted an award by the judge that was $14,527 higher than that predicted by students assigned to the defendant role, and that their fair settlement estimates were $17,709 higher than defendants'-biases of a substantial magnitude, given that the judge's "award" was only $30,560. The researchers also found (unsurprisingly) that the larger the difference in both predicted judicial awards and fair value assessments within each negotiating pair, the longer their negotiations took and the greater the likelihood they would experience bargaining impasse. 48 In the follow-up 1998 Experiment, the researchers replicated their 1993 Experiment. However, they also tested the efficacy of a simple "considerthe-opposite" (CTO) instruction in de-biasing judgment and improving bargaining behavior on the part of 98 MBA students at two different schools. The researchers found that a "list the weaknesses in your case" CTO prompt (given to half of the plaintiffs and half of the defendants, but not to students in the control condition) was highly effective in reducing bias and promoting settlement. 49 
E. Alterations to Precursor Studies
In the current study, we revised and expanded on these two experiments, utilizing only law students as our subjects and introducing NFC testing as a third variable. We were attracted by the factual ambiguity and realism of the original Texas case file materials, and so decided to use them again. However, for reasons described below, we made four 47 . Id. at 150. 48. Id. 49. Babcock et al., supra note 32, at 918-20. In the control condition, students assigned to the plaintiff role submitted arbitral predictions that were, on average, more than $20,000 higher than those students assigned to the defendant role. In the de-biasing condition, the average differential in arbitral predictions was reduced to less than $5000. Thirty-five percent of student pairs in the control condition failed to settle their case within the 30-minute negotiation period, but only 4% failed to settle in the de-biasing condition. Id. For a comparative discussion of the impact of CTO on law students in our study, see infra Part IV.A.
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Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 59:173 significant alterations to the design of the original experiments that complicate the comparison of our results with those from the earlier ones. First, we assigned students to the role of plaintiff's or defendant's counsel rather than to the role of litigants themselves, in order to determine if, as agents, they would demonstrate a similar or different degree of partisan role bias as participants assigned to the role of plaintiffs and defendants in the two previous studies. (In order to help them assume this role, we also gave them some brief instructions on Texas tort and evidence law so that they would understand the legal rules that would apply to the case.)
Second, because we were utilizing other professors' students and not our own and wanted them to take the exercise seriously, we increased the reward structure for accurate predictions of the judge's arbitration award, from (a largely symbolic) $1 for all valuations within $5000 of the judge's award to a possible high of $100 for predicted valuations closest to that award.
Third, we modified the de-biasing prompt given to half of the students in the sample. In the 1998 Experiment, students in the de-biasing groups were instructed as follows:
In experiments based on this case we have found evidence of "selfserving interpretations of fairness." When we ask plaintiffs and defendants to predict the ruling of the judge, and to tell us what they think is a fair settlement of the case, plaintiffs' answers to both questions are typically $20,000 greater than defendants'. Furthermore, when the difference between the plaintiff and the defendant is large-when the plaintiff thinks a much higher settlement is fair than does the defendant-the parties are much less likely to settle the case and more likely to "go to court" and incur legal expenses. This occurs because each side is "holding out" for what they legitimately think is a fair settlement.
Disputants don't always think carefully about the weaknesses in their own case and are therefore surprised when the judge's ruling is worse than their expectations. For plaintiffs, this means that the judge's award is worse than their expectations. For defendants, this means that the judge's award is often greater than their We redacted the italicized sentence from our de-biasing prompts, concerned that it might be too suggestive, and retained the remaining language.
Fourth, and importantly, student participants in both the 1993 and 1998 Experiments were asked the following two questions:
1. What is your best guess of the amount of the judge's award?
What do you consider a fair amount for [the plaintiff] to receive in an out of court settlement from the vantage point of a neutral third party?
This wording of question 2 seemed to us to combine, and perhaps conflate, two different ways of assessing a case for settlement. As previously described, prior research demonstrates that people often make fairness assessments based on self-serving, subjective standards, and not "from the vantage point of a neutral third party." To better distinguish more objective and more subjective ways of assessing a case, we changed the formulation of question 2 to read: "Irrespective of the judge's award, what would you consider a fair amount for [the plaintiff] to receive in damages to settle this case out of court?" By framing the question in this way, we were attempting to prompt participants to differentiate between the outcome they considered most likely and the outcome they would deem most just. 51 50. Materials on file with senior author (emphasis added). 51. Emphases added. We made other minor changes to the original experiments as well. First, we changed the name of the case file from "Jones v. Johnson" to "Platt v. Dixon" to more clearly distinguish the two litigants and make it easier for participants to remember their assigned role. Second, to account for inflation, we updated all financial figures in the case by a factor of 50%, including plaintiff's demand for damages (changed from $100,000 to $150,000) and the judge's arbitration award (changed from $30,560 to $45,840). Third, we administered this survey as an online, unmonitored, out-of-class exercise (with a recommended completion time of 45 minutes), rather than as in-class, written one.
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II. METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

A. Hypotheses
Our study was designed to test four hypotheses: First, we expected to replicate previous findings of partisan role bias on the part of lawyers and law students in a representative role, i.e., we expected that participants representing the plaintiff would assign higher valuations to the case than those representing the defendant, despite assuming the role of agents rather than principals as in the previous two studies.
Second, we expected that the effects of partisan role bias would be greater for participants with high (vs. low) dispositional need for closure.
Third, we expected to replicate the de-biasing effect of consider-theopposite prompts, by demonstrating reduced partisan bias in the de-biasing (vs. control) condition.
Fourth, given their preference for certainty over ambiguity, we hypothesized that individuals with a high need for closure would be more resistant to de-biasing interventions than individuals with a low need for closure.
B. Sample
After receiving IRB approval to conduct the study, we sent out list serve solicitations describing its purpose and design to U.S. law professors teaching dispute resolution and clinical courses. Fourteen instructors from twelve geographically diverse public and private law schools (Arizona State, Brooklyn, Case Western Reserve, University of Connecticut, Laverne, University of Missouri, New England, University of Oregon, Quinnipiac, University of South Carolina, University of Wisconsin and Vermont Law School) participated, after securing approvals from their home institutions. Instructors were requested to provide the materials to their students as an online survey homework assignment, to be followed by in-class negotiations based on students' randomly assigned role in the case. The in-class negotiations (which most but not all instructors assigned) were not part of our investigation.
Four hundred and ninety-two participants completed the study online. reported in the debriefing questions being in the wrong role (e.g., representing the plaintiff despite having received instructions to represent the defendant). In addition, seven participants did not list any weaknesses in their case, despite being given a de-biasing prompt instructing them to do so. Three participants did not complete the Need for Closure questionnaire. One participant completed the study twice and one participant received the wrong instructions because of a technical problem in the software that was later fixed. We excluded these twenty-four participants from the subsequent analyses. Thus, the main analyses refer to 468 participants (251 females and 216 males, 1 participant did not report their gender; M age = 25.6, SD age = 4.24). Of these, 251 were first-year students, 121 were second-year students and 92 were third-year students. Four subjects were graduate-level or foreign students and one subject did not indicate his or her year. Almost all participants (455 of 468) had completed at least the negligence portion of their required first-year Torts course before taking the survey. Only 142 participants had completed the study of Evidence. None of these demographic variables-gender, year in law school or completed coursework--had any statistically significant effect on any of the measures tested in this study.
C. Procedure and Materials
All student subjects completed the study utilizing the Qualtrics.com online platform. The computer program randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions depending on their role in the task (plaintiff's attorney/defendant's attorney) and whether or not they would receive the de-biasing prompt (de-biasing/control). All subjects were provided a general information sheet and consent form describing the study. They were told that they would read a condensed version of a case file from an actual personal injury case in which they would represent either the plaintiff or the defendant. They were further informed that they would be asked to predict the judge-arbitrator's award in the case, as well as to state what a fair settlement outcome in the case would be, irrespective of that award.
In order to incentivize participants to work carefully on the task, we instructed them that their class instructor would be asking them to negotiate with another student in a future class based on the case valuation estimates they provided online. As an additional incentive, we promised ten monetary prizes (gift cards worth $50 or $100) to participants across the entire pool of subjects whose estimations of the judge's award was closest to the "actual" award ($45,840). Participants were also told that they could choose to complete a different class assignment (e.g., reading a paper) instead of this assignment, but none selected this option. After consenting to participate in the study, participants answered a few demographic questions and completed the NFC 42-item inventory (See Appendix below). Next, participants were presented with identical case file materials from Platt v. Dixon. The file consisted of 27 pages of information, including the litigation complaint and answer, a diagram of the accident site, excerpts from party and witness depositions, and documents pertaining to the parties' previous driving records as well as plaintiff's claimed medical expenses and other out-of-pocket damages. After reading these case materials, half of the participants were given the de-biasing prompt in which they were alerted to the existence of partisan bias in case valuation and asked to write down potential weaknesses in their client's case. All students were then asked for their case evaluations, in two parts:
After reading the case materials, but before you are assigned by your instructor to negotiate, please answer the following questions: 1) What is your best guess of the amount of the judge's award, if any, to Platt? Enter a number between 0 and $150,000 below.
2) Irrespective of the judge's award, what would you consider a fair amount for Platt to receive in damages to settle this case out of court? Enter a number between 0 and $150,000 below.
At the end of the survey, participants answered a few questions designed to assess whether they understood the instructions and followed them as intended. To confirm that the participants knew the role to which they were assigned, we asked them to indicate whether they represented the plaintiff or the defendant. We also asked participants whether there was anything in the instructions for the study with which they struggled. Finally, we asked participants if they could determine the purpose of the study. No one guessed the purpose of the NFC Scale.
D. Design
The design of this study was Case Valuation (Judge's award/Fair amount) x Assigned Role (Plaintiff attorney/Defendant attorney) x Debiasing Condition (Control/De-biasing). The first variable was manipulated within participants and the other two variables were manipulated between participants. In addition, we measured participants' need for cognitive closure and analyzed the data to determine whether high-NFC subjects were more susceptible to self-serving bias and more resistant to de-biasing prompts than low-NFC subjects.
III. STUDY RESULTS
Before conducting the main analyses to test our predictions, we tested the reliability of the NFC scale. 52 The obtained reliability was high (Cronbach's alpha = 0.85), the mean score was 3.78 with 3.5 being the midpoint on the 6-point Likert scale. As can be seen from the histogram of the NFC scores below (Figure 1) , the distribution of the NFC scores is normal and tight around the mean (SD = 0.42). ANOVA with role (defendant attorney/plaintiff attorney) and de-biasing condition (control/de-biasing) as between participants' factors revealed no 52. Some NFC scholars have argued that the "decisiveness in decision-making" sub-scale on the original NFCS is an independent and distinctive dimension, not significantly related to the other four factors on the scale. We used a random intercept mixed linear model to analyze participants' valuations of the case. 53 Because each participant provided two valuations of the case-what could be called an objective valuation-predicting what a neutral, impartial judge would award in arbitration, and a subjective evaluation-stating what settlement amount, in his or her opinion, would be "fair," we coded the Case Valuation variable as the Level 1 (within participant) predictor (-0.5 -the judge's award and 0.5 -fair amount), so that 0 would represent the average of the objective and subjective valuations. Similarly, we centered on zero the Level 2 (between participants) predictors-the assigned role (-0.5 -defendant attorney, 0.5 -plaintiff attorney) and the de-biasing condition (-0.5 -control, 0.5 -debiasing). Finally, the NFC scores were linearly transformed so that their mean would also be centered at zero. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1 , below. We then report these analyses for each of our
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Note. Participants' predictions were regressed onto one Level 1 (within participant) predictor Case Valuation (-0.5 -the judge's award and 0.5 -fair amount), and three Level 2 (between participants) predictors-Role (-0.5 -defendant attorney, 0.5 -plaintiff attorney), the de-biasing condition (-0.5 -control, 0.5 -de-biasing), and NFC scores (centered at zero). The letter "K" indicates thousands of dollars.
A. Hypothesis 1: Effects of Assigned Role on Overall Case Assessments
Our first hypothesis was that students randomly assigned to the role of plaintiff's or defendant's counsel would exhibit partisan role bias in their overall case assessments, just as students assigned to a party role had in the 1993 and 1998 Experiments. Our findings generally support this hypothesis, with some features and differences from the findings of the previous Experiments that are intriguing.
The overall results for students assigned to both the control group and the de-biasing group on each side of the litigation are presented in Table 2 , below: "Overall $ value" in Table 2 represents students' mean estimates of the value of Platt v. Dixon, averaging their predictions of the most likely arbitral award and their assessments of the case's "fair settlement" value. "Partisan Bias" refers to the mean difference in overall case valuations submitted by plaintiff and defendant lawyers. As can be seen from this table, the main effect of role was significant, t(460) = 3.30, p = .001, Cohen's d = 0.31, indicating that, on average, participants representing the plaintiff (n = 240; including both those who received the de-biasing prompt and those who did not) predicted case values (averaged across the fair settlement amount and the judge's predicted award) to be $9,309 higher than those who represented the defendant (n = 228). This result replicates previous findings of partisan role bias on the part of representative lawyers.
We acknowledge the artificiality of averaging our participants' arbitral predictions and fair settlement assessments to yield a combined "overall value" for Platt v. Dixon. We report the measure in this way because it is consistent with previous research, which has mostly treated partisan role bias on the part of lawyers or law students as a unitary phenomenon. For example, in concluding that most lawyers are more overconfident than accurate in their litigation forecasts, Goodman-Delahunty and her colleagues asked civil and criminal litigators to specify an outcome in a pending case that they would consider their "minimum goal" for the case, as well as the probability they "will achieve this outcome or something better." 54 The researchers did not ask their subjects whether their specified goal was based on an objective prediction of the most likely trial result, their sense of what a "fair" outcome would be, or some combination of these two factors. Their research design did not distinguish these different ways of valuing a case, as ours enabled us to do.
When in fact we disaggregated these two valuation methods among the entire sample of respondents, we found that participants' "fair value" assessments were far more susceptible to partisan role bias than were their predictions of the most likely arbitral award. Specifically, plaintiff lawyers' estimates of the fair settlement value of the case were $16,134 higher than the estimates of those who represented the defendant, t(612) = 5.28, p < .001, d = 0.51. By contrast, when it came to predicting the judge's most likely award, the difference between the plaintiff lawyer and defense lawyer predictions was only $2,483, an effect that was not statistically significant, t < 1. This greater susceptibility of participants' fair value assessments to partisan bias was significant, b = 13,456, se = 2,294, β = .10, se = .02, t(460) = 5.87, p < .0001.
We then analyzed the results for the students in the control group only, so as to be able to compare those results to the findings of the 1993 Experiment, which did not include a de-biasing condition as part of its design. These results are presented in As can be seen from Table 3 , random assignment to the role of attorney for plaintiff or defendant in the control condition produced a difference in overall case evaluations of $12,261, which was also statistically significant, t(460) = 2.98, p = .003, d = 0.38.
Again, however, when we disaggregated the differences in students' predictions of the most likely judicial arbitral award and their assessments of the case's fair settlement value, different patterns emerged. The differential between plaintiff lawyers' and defense lawyers' assessments of a fair settlement value for the case was more than double the differential in their arbitral predictions. In the control condition, the plaintiff's lawyers predicted arbitral awards that were $8,172 higher than those of the defense lawyers, t(612) = 1.81, p = .07, d = 0.24, a marginally significant difference. By contrast, the plaintiff's lawyers' fair settlement value assessments were $16,351 higher than those of the defense lawyers-a difference that was highly significant, t(612) = 3.70, p < .0001, d = 0.49. As in the across de-biasing conditions analysis reported above, this greater susceptibility of participants' fair value assessments to partisan bias was significant, b = 8,077, se = 3,262, β = 0.06 , se =0.02, t(460) = 2.48, p = .014. We also wanted to compare the magnitude of the partisan bias exhibited by students in our control condition to that found in those earlier experiments. The effect size of partisan role bias on students' arbitral predictions in our study was much smaller than those obtained by both the 1993 Experiment and the 1998 Experiment. 
B. Hypothesis 2: Effects of NFC on Partisan Role Bias
Our second hypothesis-and the main focus of our study-was that our data would show an interaction between participants' Need for Cognitive Closure scores and their susceptibility to partisan role bias. Consistent with that hypothesis, we found that participants with higher NFC scores were far more susceptible to partisan role bias than those with lower NFC scores, b = 14,260, se = 6,737, β = .09, se = .04, t(460) = 2.12, p =.035. This interaction is depicted in Figures 2 through 4 below. 55 . We reached this conclusion by comparing our effect sizes to the effect sizes for arbitral predictions and fairness assessments, based on the mean differences, standard errors and sample sizes provided in Loewenstein, et al., supra note 11, at 151 ( Figures 2 through 4 , "critical value" signifies the NFC score threshold at which partisan role bias began to become significant. As can generally be seen from these figures, the moderating effect of NFC scores on students' susceptibility to partisan role bias was similar for all three methods of case valuation, given that the slopes of the three graphs are all basically the same. However, in each figure, the effect of students' need for closure scores on partisan bias became statistically significant at a different point on the graph.
For each graph in
In Figure 2 , "overall $ value" again represents students' mean estimates of the value of Platt v. Dixon, averaging their predictions of the most likely arbitral award and their assessments of the case's fair settlement value. When utilizing this valuation method, the effect of individual NFC scores on students' case valuations became significant just above the midpoint of the NFC 6-point scale -at 3.56. In our sample, more than 70% of participants registered NFC scores at or above this point.
Again, however, when we disaggregated students' arbitral predictions (Figure 3 ) from their estimates of fair settlement value (Figure 4) , different patterns emerged. Recall that we found no statistically significant bias in students' arbitral predictions based on their assigned role: on
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Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 59:173 average, students appeared to be able to predict without bias how a judge might decide a factually ambiguous case. Figure 3 is consistent with this finding, showing that only 14% of students in our sample-those with very high NFC scores (at or above 4.24) --exhibited partisan bias in their arbitral predictions. Figure 4 is also consistent with our earlier findings and reveals the converse effect: Because most students in our sample exhibited partisan role bias in their fair settlement assessments, only students with low NFC scores (3.28 or lower, constituting only 11.32% of our sample) were able to avoid such self-serving bias.
C. Hypothesis 3: Effects of CTO De-biasing Prompts on Case Valuations
As described earlier, plaintiff and defendant attorneys assigned to the de-biasing condition in our study were asked to generate and list potential weaknesses of their case. Because they worked on their own, without supervision, we read their responses with some care to try to determine how seriously they approached this task. Overall, our assessment is that most participants took the instruction seriously and generally listed sensible reasons why their client's case might be questionable, regarding both proof of liability and damages. 56 On the defendant attorney side, for example, one student wrote: "Defendant's inability to remember [much of anything] undermines his stance that he was not impaired by the drinks he'd had that day." On the plaintiff attorney's side, one student noted: "The plaintiff did not get medical help at the scene of the accident and didn't go to a doctor until months later." The great majority of participants listed more than one case weakness; some listed as many as four or five.
How well did the de-biasing prompt work? Contrary to our expectations, it had different effects depending on the case valuation method (see Figures 5 & 6) . 56 . One exception to this was students' tendency to assume that plaintiff's and defendant's previous traffic citations would be admissible in court as "habit evidence" --a highly dubious conclusion. See, e.g., Waldon v. City of Longview, 855 S.W. 2d 875, 879-80 (Tex. Ct. App 1993) (defendant police officer's three prior accidents insufficient to constitute a habit). This was an understandable mistake, however, given that most subjects had not taken or completed a course in Evidence.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/12 
D. Hypothesis 4: Effects of NFC on Susceptibility to De-Biasing Prompts
Finally, importantly, and also contrary to our expectations, we did not find any statistically significant differences (p = .63) between high-and low-NFC individuals in their receptivity to de-biasing prompts. While this lack of effect could be attributable to insufficient statistical power or some other design problem, it appears that high-NFC law students are as open as low-NFC students to de-biasing strategies designed to reduce partisanship in a representative role. These findings may suggest that, while high-NFC students have a motivational preference for certainty and closure over ambiguity, they have the cognitive capacity to entertain ambiguity when prompted to do so. 57 . It is impossible to compare these results to those of Babcock et al., supra note 32, because the researchers in that study reported the effects of their consider-the-opposite de-biasing prompts on participants' arbitral predictions only. In addition, as described supra Part I.E, we modified the CTO prompt used in that study, confounding the possibility of any direct comparisons.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Our study is subject to a number of obvious limitations. First, as previously noted, we altered several important features from the studies we replicated, complicating the task of teasing out firm conclusions about the reasons why some of our results differed from those of the studies we replicated. In addition, our sample of participating law students, although reasonably diverse in terms of geography and demographics, was not randomly selected and may or may not be representative of experienced lawyers working on actual cases, with real clients and often high-stakes consequences.
The fact that the survey was administered online, in non-laboratory conditions without direct faculty supervision, also presents questions. While the great majority of participants completed the assignment within the suggested 45-minute timeline, a few completed it faster and a few completed it intermittently over the course of several days. This raises questions about the level of attention given to the exercise by participants and whether they consulted with other students regarding their case valuations, rather than working alone. 58 On the other hand, the online administration of our survey may also have increased the "noisiness" of our data, which should have lowered our odds of obtaining significant results. The fact that we managed to obtain significant effects despite these obstacles makes us suspect that the real effects might be larger.
These questions and limitations aside, the present study helps us understand the workings of partisan role bias on a more granular level than previous studies have done, across several dimensions. First, taken as a whole, and consistent with our main hypothesis, our data suggest that the partisan role bias previously reported in studies of real and simulated lawyering behavior cannot be attributed to lawyers and law students generally, but is rather moderated by individuals' need for cognitive closure. The greater a law student's need for closure, the greater the risk that he or she will be influenced by self-serving biases in a representative role. Partisan role bias, it is thus not surprising to find, exists along a continuum. Some students are highly prone to engage in self-serving and/or one-sided thinking, many students are somewhat prone to do so, and some students may in fact be under-confident about their cases and/or too eager to see the other side's point of view. A simple-toadminister motivational scale exists that seems to predict individual students' degree of susceptibility to judgmental role biases with a fair degree of accuracy.
Second, despite the fact that we weakened the de-biasing consider-theopposite prompt from the one used in the precursor studies, we found that all law students-even high-NFC students--could be prompted to be less biased-at least in their predictive judgments.
Taken together, these two findings have considerable potential significance for how law schools train their students to assume the role of lawyer. If we want students to be able to overcome their cognitive and motivational biases--as well as the bias "blind spot" that affects us all 59 --we must help them understand the degree to which they are susceptible to self-serving biases in the first place. Students preparing for a lifetime of representative lawyering cannot intuitively know where they fall on this spectrum. If administered in the classroom, especially in conjunction with simulated lawyering exercises like the one used in this study, the NFC Scale holds the promise of helping students better understand their own tendencies toward self-serving bias in a representative lawyering role.
Moreover, the success of our consider-the-opposite prompt in debiasing even high-NFC students' arbitral predictions suggests that with proper instruction and practice, all law students can not only learn about their potential susceptibility to role bias in their legal predictions, but also can take effective steps to reduce bias in their predictive judgments by regularly practicing modes of counter-attitudinal thinking.
B. Predictive Judgments versus Fairness Assessments
Next, our results suggest that "partisan role bias" may not be a unitary phenomenon as previously assumed in studies of lawyering judgment, but rather may consist of predictive judgments and fairness assessments operating independently of one another. As described earlier, previous empirical studies have consistently found that agents (including lawyers) are affected by partisan role biases when they assume a representative role. 60 But no previous studies have attempted to draw as clear a demarcation as our study did between predictions of the most likely judicial outcome in a case on the one hand, and more subjective assessments of its "fair settlement value" on the other.
The standard economic theory of bargaining suggests that there ought to be little difference between lawyers' predictions of the most likely judicial outcome in a case on the one hand, and their advice to clients about what constitutes a "fair settlement" on the other. Negotiation instructors commonly teach their students how to determine the "expected value" of a disputed claim, by objectively evaluating the approximate odds of winning the case, determining the most likely damage award, and deducting the costs of an expected trial. 61 Indeed, the authors of the 1993 and 1998 Experiments seem to have assumed that survey students' arbitral predictions and fair settlement assessments would be roughly the same. Writing in 1995, they commented, "Even when parties have the same information, they will come to different conclusions about what a fair settlement would be and base their predictions of judicial behavior on Our findings suggest that this assumption may not have been correct. Although students' arbitral predictions were only marginally affected by their assignment to the role of plaintiff's or defendant's counsel, their fairness assessments were, on average, highly influenced by their role assignment. When participants were prompted to distinguish their own assessments of a fair settlement value for Platt v. Dixon from their predictions of the judge's most likely arbitral award, the difference between plaintiffs' lawyers' and defendants' lawyers' fair settlement value assessments was double the difference between the two groups' arbitral predictions.
The large gap we found in plaintiff attorney and defendant attorney assessments of the fair settlement value of the case is surprising when one considers the rather quotidian nature of the Platt v. Dixon simulation. While one might expect fairness considerations to play a significant role in partisan assessments of cases involving claims of deliberate misconduct (e.g., discrimination, fraud, assault and the like), or difficult relational claims (e.g., high conflict divorce cases, messy partnership dissolutions or workplace disputes), the case under study was an online simulation of an everyday car accident case between strangers. A simple car accident case is not the sort of matter likely to produce controversy about the fairness of the governing legal rules. ("The principles of negligence may require that result, but I think it's unfair!") While it is true that the case file presented some contested evidence of drunk driving on the part of the defendant, as well as a perhaps exaggerated damage claim by the plaintiff, we would not have predicted such a strong "fairness" reaction on the part of respondents to these materials.
Nonetheless, these results are potentially significant in light of the 1993 Experiment's finding that differences in fair settlement value assessments within negotiation pairs were even better predictors of bargaining impasse than comparable differences in bargainers' arbitral predictions. We know from highly stylized experiments like the "Ultimatum Game" that perceptions of unfair conduct by one negotiator can cause an opposing 
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Lawyering Bias and Need for Closure 207 negotiator to make objectively irrational decisions. 63 We would hypothesize that clashing fairness norms may play an even greater role with practicing lawyers-who have real clients, real adversaries and negotiate for real stakes-than they would play in any online simulation involving law students. The field would benefit from additional empirical research on how objective determinations of case value and subjective fairness assessments combine to affect lawyers in their actual negotiations and client counseling.
C. De-Biasing Fairness Assessments
Next, while the "consider-the-opposite" de-biasing prompt we gave students was effective in de-biasing their arbitral predictions, it was not effective in de-biasing their fairness assessments. How does one explain this finding and what are its possible implications?
In retrospect, this result is perhaps not surprising. Previous research suggests that consider-the-opposite prompts are primarily effective in debiasing judgments involved in objective and predictive tasks such as assessing the evidence regarding the effectiveness of capital punishment in deterring crime 64 or deciding whether or not to fly the Space Shuttle Challenger mission under specified simulated weather conditions. 65 Research suggests that a different de-biasing strategy-perspective-taking, i.e., the attempt to prompt people to consider and articulate how the world looks to others-is more effective in mitigating egocentric judgments about what is "fair" in social or competitive settings. Perspective-taking prompts have been shown, for example, to reduce egocentric biases in individuals' views about what is fair pay for themselves versus others on an assigned work task, 66 their perspectives about the relative value of their own contributions to a group project, 67 In legal dispute settings, a perspective-taking intervention might, for example, ask a disputant or his lawyer to "step into the shoes" of the opposing party, for example by considering how the opponent's actions might have a different and more innocent explanation. ("From Plaintiff Platt's perspective, can you think of some other reason, other than that he was inventing his injuries, why he might have waited two months to consult a doctor?") We did not attempt a manipulation of this kind because it was not part of the studies that we were replicating.
Explicit training in taking the perspective of an opponent is not a standard a part of the law school curriculum to nearly the same degree as is the training that requires students to read judicial opinions and take the perspective of a neutral judge. Nor is "fairness" typically much discussed in the law school classroom, particularly the kind of subjective fairness norms that can strongly affect people in conflict. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which perspective-taking prompts reduce self-serving assessments of fairness in a representative lawyering role, and, if effective, what steps law schools might take to increase such training as part of their standard curricula.
D. Lack of Significant Bias in Students' Arbitral Predictions
Finally, recall the findings of the earlier studies under replication-that students were significantly biased in both their arbitral predictions and fair settlement value assessments. By contrast, when we asked our student participants to distinguish their predictions of what a judge most likely would award the plaintiff Platt in arbitration from what settlement outcome in the case "irrespective of the arbitral award" they would consider "fair," we found that their fair settlement value assessments were highly affected by their role assignment, but their arbitral predictions were only marginally affected by them. 
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How does one explain these differing arbitral results? As one possibility, it may be that when students assume the role of lawyerrepresentatives, they are somewhat less susceptible to predictive biases than when assigned to the role of principals, because of the greater distance and objectivity inherent in that role. 69 This explanation has a surface plausibility and is also consistent with our data, as we found smaller mean differences between the plaintiff and defendant lawyers' valuations than the mean differences between the parties' valuations obtained in the previous studies. On the other hand, if representatives are really less susceptible than principals to bias, how does one explain the persistence of significant partisan bias that we found in students' fair settlement value assessments?
A second, more likely explanation for our differing arbitral results is that the law students in our sample, by dint of their training and experience reading judicial decisions, were better able than the non-law students in the two previous studies to take external reality constraints into account when predicting how a judge might rule in a factually ambiguous case. In a well-known book, former Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman argued that the case method of instruction, used in every U.S. law school, instills in students the ability to "suppress all sympathies in favor of a judge's scrupulous neutrality" and helps them make more accurate predictions about judicial outcomes and other uncertain legal events. 70 According to this hypothesis, after one or two or three years of reading appellate decisions and taking a judicial perspective, the law students in our sample would have been better able than the non-law students in the previous studies to reason to themselves, "I may think that this case is worth [X], but judges are unpredictable, and who knows what this judge might do."
But this explanation has difficulties as well. The 1993 Experiment in fact included eighty law students in its sample. However, the researchers found no statistically significant differences between their responses and the responses of the eighty undergraduates also in their sample, and Our finding that law students were only marginally biased in their predictions of future judicial outcomes could therefore benefit from replication. For example, the 1993 Experiment did not indicate whether the law students in its sample were comprised of first-year students only, or a combination of first-year and upper-division students, as in our study. It seems likely that law students improve in their ability to make dispassionate judicial predictions as they progress through their studies. Recently, researchers have begun to investigate how novice and experienced medical students' diagnostic skills improve over time and are affected by their need for cognitive closure.
72 Similar experiments could be designed to attempt to document improvements in first, second and third year law students' ability to make objective predictions.
CONCLUSION
Representative lawyers are valued, in part, for the accuracy and objectivity of the advice they provide their clients. Partisanship and zeal are expected of lawyers as well, but partisanship may poorly serve a client's interests if the lawyer's advice is distorted by biases of which he or she is unaware. The present study underscores the importance of teaching law students to be self-aware about the unconscious biases that may cloud their judgment when they begin to take on a representative lawyering role. It provides a method for testing students' susceptibility to judgmental bias on an individual basis. And it provides supporting evidence for earlier studies that demonstrate the value of counterattitudinal thinking as a de-biasing strategy for improving predictive judgment.
This kind of self-knowledge and training is critical for all law students who, as prospective representative attorneys, will soon be giving advice to 71 clients. But no matter what students do with their law degrees after they graduate, they can potentially play a vital social role in improving the quality of discourse on controversial public issues to the extent that they are able to model flexible, nuanced thinking and openness to opposing points of view. Viewed from that broader perspective, the kind of training described in this article might well be included in every law school curriculum.
The current study leaves unresolved a number of important questions: Do law students improve in their dispassion and objectivity of judgment as they proceed through law school? If so, by how much, and is this improvement moderated by their need for closure? To what extent are lawyers influenced by subjective considerations of fairness when advising their clients about potential courses of action? In what kinds of contexts does this occur, and with what effects? American legal education is sometimes criticized for doing a credible job of preparing students to make predictions about future legal outcomes, by applying legal rules to a set of facts, but a less-than-optimal job in preparing students for the more subjective, affective aspects of law practice, in which strong feelings and hostile attributions often hold sway, and clashing norms of "fairness" compete with one another. 73 What, if anything, can law schools do to improve in this dimension? Questions such as these would benefit from further investigation. Beyond this, the need for cognitive closure may provide a heretofore unexplored and potentially useful conceptual frame for examining the decision making of other key actors in the legal system-practicing attorneys, judges and juries. 
